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The paper focuses on how patterns and modes of global interdependence combined 
with the privatisation of risk, influence human development. International finance plays 
an important developmental role. However, the privatisation of risk, a result of 
increasingly unregulated and liberalised financial markets, tend to create speculative 
activities with major negative systemic effects that hinder positive human development, 
especially in the developing countries. However, sustainable human development 
requires more than financial stability. Internally oriented socioeconomic and political 
reforms (IOSR) are essential for the developing countries, especially in the present phase 
of their demographic transition. Such reforms could provide both resilience and adaptive 
capacity for societies to cope in an environment of increased interdependence, the article 
concludes. 
 
Some for the Glories of This World; and some 
Sigh for the Prophet’s Paradise to come; 
Ah, take the Cash, and let the promise go, 
Nor heed the music of a distant Drum 
    [Rubaiyat Omar Khayyam XIII, (1985, 1909)]. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a great pleasure to return to Pakistan, especially to this forum. I feel very 
honoured to have the opportunity of addressing this conference and the distinguished 
audience. When Dr Kemal indicated the theme of the Conference and the focus of my 
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talk, I felt reluctant. The Conference theme is complex and challenging and this forum 
includes many outstanding authorities. The present context of global interdependence and 
its associated inter- and intra national distribution of power and knowledge make it even 
more of a challenge to deal with the stated theme: Growth, Decentralisation and Poverty. 
These are subjects that have for many centuries produced competing paradigms with 
unresolved puzzles. At present, the field is charged with serious attempts for reason and 
understanding as well as with passion and emotions. My talk, accordingly, is partly based 
on empirical evidence, and is partly exploratory, evidently following the visionary 
perspective of the founding father of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam. 
The present phase of global interdependence is evolving both in structure and 
institutions, and in socio-economic and political management, with significant impact 
on local and global structures. This evolution, although accelerating, is not of recent 
origin. It is part of the more fundamental human symbolic cultural evolution, a 
continuous, if not a continuity of a process of human adaptation. There is a longer 
period—even millennia—of history that should bring light to the nature of the present 
global path. However, as discussed elsewhere [Sirageldin (2001)], that path is largely 
undetermined, a consequence of imbalance in the nature of the present “symbolic” 
human cultural evolution. “Symbolism” implies universality in scientific communi-
cation. It has been the nucleus of the present globalisation process; a process based on 
the global spread of technology, finance capital, and a global labour market, rather than 
on military conquest. However, the present “technophysio” phase of the human 
symbolic cultural evolution is not necessarily stable or balanced. It tends to produce a 
technical civilisation with built-in contradictions and continues to produce negative 
social goods. It has been common practice in analysing the consequences of 
globalisation, to assume that its outcomes, whether goods or ills, are independent of the 
evolutionary processes of human nature. This is evidently a confusion of cause and 
effect. Furthermore, while analysis attempts to deal with present outcomes and 
processes, institutions seem to evolve slowly and lack the adaptive capacity necessary 
for a harmonious evolution. Institutions, especially socio-political, seem to adhere 
more to past practice. 
The present paper focuses on how patterns and modes of global interdependence 
combined with the privatisation of risk, influence human development. What are the 
prospects for human development? Are short-term setbacks inevitable? How do they 
influence prospects for the longer term? These are the critical questions that require 
answers. But what we are able to offer is mainly speculative in nature. Speculation as 
will be evident seems to be a major source of malaise in the present global 
environment. Speculators in global finance tend to create more, larger and mostly 
unpredictable risk in the financial and labour markets. Although risk is being 
increasingly privatised, a result of reduced regulatory capacities as liberalisation has 
spread worldwide during the past three decades, it tends to produce more serious 
systemic effects that are detrimental to human development, especially in the Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
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developing and emerging economies. The issues are complex and the pathways to 
human development are not clear at best. We focus the discussion on some key 
pathways. These are the diffusion of technology and its effect on global inter-
dependence, the privatisation of risk and its management; the changing socio-economic 
roles of national and local governments; and finally, attempt to examine the 
implications of these dynamics to human development in this emerging global 
environment.  
 
II.  GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE COMMUNICATION 
REVOLUTOIN: AN EVOLVING LANDSCAPE  
OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM! 
 
If globalisation is to be taken seriously as a policy instrument, it must 
be conceptually well defined. Otherwise it will become a mere 
catchword, a burden to the government that embraces it. It will 
generate more enemies than friends. 
[Charles F. Doran (2000), p. 5]. 
 
Globalisation defined in this discussion as increased interdependence among 
countries and communities through mutual learning is viewed as a process with varied 
phases, a connected history, rather than any abrupt phenomenon that emerged in the 
last few decades or even centuries. As we mentioned earlier, it is an outgrowth of the 
onset of the symbolic cultural evolutionary phase. In that phase, human societies 
continually attempt to balance the three acquired modes of human nature: scientific 
development, time binding for setting social priorities and planning ahead, and 
imaginal thinking for creative thinking. The modus operandi of the symbolic cultural 
evolution is the maximisation of survival probabilities by individuals and groups, 
leading inevitably to increased interdependence [Sirageldin (1999)]. Viewed as a 
process of increased interdependence, globalisation started taking shape from the time 
civilisations began communicating and interacting with one another via different 
means.  It has been a cumulative process. We could safely take this process back to the 
time of maritime explorations and adventures, slave trade, and colonisation manifested 
in the exchange, whether voluntary or forced of labour, technology and capital inputs, 
and of values and beliefs. With technological progress and roundabout production 
processes came the attempt to seek outlets for capitalistic over-production. In all its 
history, the process of increased interdependence has changed the economic and 
political fortunes of societies, nations and even continents. Historically, these changes 
have been the result of many factors as for example the presence of hegemony in 
military and technological power, e.g., Great Britain in the past few centuries or the 
U.S. at the present time. A process that seems to vindicate the notion that economic 
development is a process of increasing returns—those who have will have more. Ismail Sirageldin 
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Although, history indicates that more does not come without a struggle, some times at 
high cost to all parties. 
The presence of a massive literature on the subject of globalisation is not 
accidental. It is a result of it being regarded if not defined as the sum of all the varied 
forces that influence global interdependence and human development (The Human 
Development Report 1999 presents extensive discussion and documentation of these 
issues. See also Doran [(2000), p. 6]). A tendency that confuses human nature with 
human processes, leading to the conclusion that globalisation is the sum of all the 
negatives for which it is allegedly responsible.  It also leads to desperate development 
paradigms and polar discourses and views.  For example some authorities view the 
present phase of globalisation as an extension of Western imperialism including the 
imperialism of ideas and beliefs [cf. Anderson, Cavanagh and Lee (2000)]. While 
others put technological advances as the main driving force. For example, as Sen 
(2000) reasoned: “Europe would have been a lot poorer had it resisted the globalisation 
of the decimal system that emerged and became well developed in India between the 
second and the sixth century, and was used extensively also by Arab mathematicians 
soon thereafter.  These procedures reached Europe mainly in the last quarter of the 
tenth century, and began having its major impact in the early years of the last 
millennium, playing a major part in the mathematical and scientific revolution that 
helped to transform Europe”.  Yet, others play down the role of technology and adopt a 
neoclassical view of international trade and international factor movements in which 
diminishing returns play a leading role in the historical patterns of global inter-
dependence and degrees of convergence [O’Rourke and Williamson (1999)]. 
Other authorities, concerned with observed negative systemic effects, make a well 
reasoned case that an unregulated global system that relies on market solutions that let the 
market go it alone is not helpful to deal with positive and sustained human development 
[cf. Naqvi (2001); Eatwell and Taylor (2000)]. The global society must deal with each 
phase of its evolution on its own grounds to minimise its negative systemic effects. As 
Ajami [(2000), p. 11] put it: “every age earns its own name after its own history and its 
dueling ambitions have played out”. That ‘dueling’ implies the taming of unregulated 
markets to save capitalism from its own follies. A difficult process with unpredictable 
outcomes since ‘saving’ has different meaning to different powers. 
In our view, it can be safely stated that the ‘present phase’ of globalisation is the 
child of the technological revolution that started at the beginning of the 20th century 
and that culminated into the present explosion of information technology and the so-
called ‘brain industry’.  As a result, we are witnessing the dissolution of boundaries 
and national authorities in innumerable aspects of practical life—the transcendence of 
globalisation beyond slave and commodity trade. For example, there is a fundamental 
change in business behaviour. The interaction of information technology (e.g., e-
commerce) and the global economy induced a need for alliances among Multinational 
Corporations to share information, ignoring borders, cultural or language differences, Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
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or geography. The only impediments are taxes and government rules. Maximum 
returns, mainly short-term are required for survival in the global market place, given 
the discipline of international finance. It is evolving as the main if not the only 
fundamental in corporate behaviour whether business or governance. 
Three major factors seem to characterise the present globalisation environment: 
innovation in communication and information technology, the dominant role of finance 
capital, and the emergence of global regulatory institutions. But these characteristics have 
been present in various forms for many centuries.  For example, there were major 
technological breakthroughs in the late 19th century and in the 1920s that had significant 
socio-economic impact. There were also regulatory institutions, some through colonial 
powers that had extensive global reach combined with strict enforcement power. What 
seems to characterise the present phase is its speed and potential destructive tendencies. 
The new ‘knowledge industry’ forms interconnected webs that are highly dynamic. It 
tends to undergo bursts of evolutionary creativity and massive extinction events of 
established technologies and, more fundamentally, established systems of values and 
social contracts and relations, while the system seems indifferent to the consequences to 
human development. In a crisis, a decline in GDP of 10 percent or more, which has not 
been uncommon in recent experience, would be socially devastating in a country with a 
fairly low per capita income and no safety net. But such devastating experience is viewed 
as part of learning the lessons of reform and the cost of growing-up, so to speak, and for 
societies to “move into the next phase of the post-global economy” [Doran (2000), p. 7]. 
What is not immediately evident is how different from past practice, in both speed and 
processes, is the impact of the present phase of globalisation on the distribution of gains 
and losses from exchange in the expanded market for knowledge and skills? There is 
evidence that the competitive global market combined with the privatisation of risk in 
both the financial and labour markets have produced inequitable returns for investment in 
human resources. These inequities are leading to unsustainable human development, 
specially, for those at the low end of the development ladder (The Human Development 
Report 1999 gives numerous illustrations). What is becoming increasingly evident is that 
the evolving patterns of global finance and governance have significant negative 
consequences to prospects of human development for increasing segments of humankind.  
 
III. FINANCE AND THE PRIVATISATION OF RISK:  
A PARADIGM IN TRANSITION 
“We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves 
of irrational psychology. On the contrary, the state of long term 
expectations is often steady—it is shared by a large number of 
ignorant individuals”. 
[John Maynard Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money (1936). Quoted in Eatwell and Taylor (2000), pp. 84, 94-95]. Ismail Sirageldin 
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As we mentioned earlier, the significant role that global finance capital plays 
in the economy and human development is not new. On the one hand, it provides for 
an important disciplinary role that promotes efficiency and capital accumulation 
based on the presence of adequate fundamentals. On the other hand, it tends to 
increase risk with negative systemic effects. The history of finance capital indicates 
that following each major innovation; finance capital follows good economic 
principles but eventually gives way to speculative ventures. Economic facts give way 
to psychological fantasy, share prices become independent of performance, leading 
to capital flight and eventual stock market collapse and prolonged economic 
recessions [Shiller (2000)].  The result has been the recurrence of large economic 
and social losses. 
The present globalisation phase seems to have more than qualitative 
differences from these previous experiences with finance capital. The modus 
operandi of the present globalisation environment is being fuelled by significant and 
accelerated pace of innovations in information and communication technology. 
These innovations introduced instant communication and information that facilitated 
the global spread of finance capital while international regulatory institutions are 
being redesigned to provide the necessary security for capital movement. Similar to 
past behaviour, the psychological element of finance capital takes over creating 
greater worldwide volatility at a much larger volume and speed, in part because of 
the efficiency of the information technology itself. Workers security and human 
development could suffer greatly as a result of investors’ psychology and not 
necessarily because of weakness in economic fundamentals. Indeed, economics take 
hold in the final analysis since irrational increases in equity prices cannot be 
sustained for long without the support of real earnings. Similarly, irrational capital 
flight should eventually reverse its course once the economic facts override 
psychological and political forces. However, the loss to human development could 
be sizable and selective in the interim and the interim could be of long duration, 
while, as discussed later, the social role of governments is being compromised in the 
global environment. 
How finance capital and speculative activities create risk with systemic 
consequences to economic and human development require elaboration. The 
discussion refers extensively to the recent excellent contribution on the subject by 
Eatwell and Taylor (2000). Their thesis may is summarised as follows (ibid, xi): 
  • A breakdown of national regulatory capacities has occurred as liberalisation 
has spread worldwide over the past four decades. Consequences have 
included high and variable interest rates, increased volatility of asset prices, 
poor national economic performances, and the contagious spread of market 
instabilities worldwide. Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
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  • Such developments create the possibility for massive upheavals even in the 
large and integrated financial markets of the industrialised economies. 
  • The recent wave of currency crises in developing and transitional economies 
has clearly been associated with rapid capital market liberalisation and the 
absence both internationally and at the country level of appropriate 
regulatory procedures to deal with the financial flows unleashed. 
  • There is absence of “fundamentals” in determining exchange rates; changes 
in rates are driven exclusively by shifting speculative “conventions” in the 
markets. Exchange rate volatility exacerbates all the deficiencies of 
unregulated markets. 
This is a serious verdict and the authors propose the creation of a world 
regulatory agency, World Financial Authority (WFA) to deal with the deficiencies in 
the present international financial system. 
An important characteristic of the present system is the privatisation of risk that 
led to the marginalisation of existing regulatory agencies. The privatisation of risk 
started when President Richard Nixon, on August 15, 1971, closed the gold window by 
instructing the US Secretary of the Treasury to suspend all sales and purchases of gold. 
This was the end of the Bretton Woods system founded in 1944 and based on fixed 
exchange rates of the then major currencies in terms of dollars, while the latter was tied 
to gold. From that point on, the stability of the system has been shaken. Floating rates 
led to the relaxation of the tight control on capital movement that freed the private 
sector from foreign exchange shocks. The incentive to deregulate international capital 
flows was driven by the need to hedge against the growing fluctuation of exchange 
rates. With the extinction of fixed exchange rates, finance risk has been privatised. 
Meanwhile, the volume of international capital flows reached unprecedented high 
levels. According to Eatwell and Taylor (p. 3-4), in 1973, daily foreign exchange 
trading around the world was less than $ 20 billion and the ratio of foreign exchange 
trading to world trade did not exceed 2/1. In 1980, average daily trading reached $ 80 
billion and the ratio increased to 10/1. By 1992, daily trading averaged $ 880 billion 
with a ratio of 50/1. In 1995 average daily trading in foreign exchange, at $ 1260 and a 
ratio of 70/1 the 1995 volume was equal to the entire world’s official gold and foreign 
exchange reserves. These massive volumes dwarf flows into long-term investment. 
They are speculative and very short run, designed primarily for short-term hedging 
against fluctuations in asset prices. This new international financial system is 
characterised by being highly volatile and susceptible to contagion. It has produced a 
succession of major financial crises. 
The privatisation of financial risk led to the privatisation of risk in labour 
markets. Traditionally, supervision and regulation of financial systems and labour 
security systems have been domestically based. But the increased global integration of 
financial and labour markets have reduced national capacity to regulate the massive Ismail Sirageldin 
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financial flows, while the present international regulatory agencies were not design to 
deal with massive destabilising private financial flows. These states of ‘absentee 
government’ have created severe hardships to human development and may not 
continue for long. 
 
IV. GOVERNANCE: THE CHANGING ROLES OF 
NATIONAL AUTHORITY 
 
International business concerns often prefer to work in orderly 
autocracies rather than in activist democracies. They may also have a 
preference for public money being spent to promote the safety and 
comfort of management over the removal of illiteracy, medical 
deprivation and other adversities of the underdogs. 
[George Soros, quoted in Amartya Sen, June (2000), p. 5]. 
 
The role of government and governance in the ‘new global environment’ seems 
to differ significantly from past environments. Past environments, excluding military 
conquest and occupation, was one of ‘interdependence’ among states regulated by 
international institutions, e.g., IMF or GATT that attempt to set rules for orderly 
cooperation as interdependence increases among sovereign states. Government 
sovereignty, especially internal, was not challenged by these regulations, taken mainly 
as safeguards [Sirageldin (1999)]. The effect of the ‘new globalisation environment’ on 
state sovereignty is subtler.  It influences both the external and internal sovereignty of 
the state, while reduces the interest of national èlites in local affairs since global 
corporate networks challenge a state's internal sovereignty by altering the relationship 
between the private and public sector. As it integrates markets, globalisation fragments 
politics [Reinicke (1997), pp. 129-130]. 
The implications of these dynamics to human development may be traced to 
insecurities introduced in labour markets and to the influence of globalisation on 
Democratic practice and the Rule of Law. Historical evidence also illustrates another 
source of risk. Historically, periods of massive industrial consolidation and dramatic 
technological innovations have been followed by periods of political, social, and 
institutional reforms.  “One eventually creates the need for the other, as the economic 
change produce social conditions that come into conflict with democratic ideals” [Judis 
(2000), p. 252)]. Clearly the functioning of the present global system complicates 
further the situation since it erodes the synergetic relations among ‘democracy’, the 
‘rule of Law’ and the ‘role of government’ summarised elsewhere [Sirageldin (1999)]. 
Historically, the struggle for freedom has been a struggle between the power 
of government with arbitrary authority and the Rule of the Law, or, according to 
Hume [quoted in Hayek (1955), p. 11], it is the evolution from a “government of will 
to a government of law”.  A “government of law”, “Equality before the Law”, or Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
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“Rule of Law” are all terms that refer to the ancient Greek concept of “Isonomy” that 
identifies a society of human freedom as opposed to an arbitrary government of 
tyrants. In this view, the Law should be obeyed so people could be free from 
arbitrary rules set for some and not for others.  However, although the Rule of Law 
provided for individual freedom and for creating and maintaining ‘trust’ in the laws, 
it erected boundaries and set limits on the freedom of both government and subjects.  
This is the case in order to “limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part 
and member of society” [Locke (1690), section 222, quoted in Hayek (1955), p. 10].  
However, although the ideal of isonomy gave ample power to governments to deal 
with a wide range of actions to enhance human development, from safeguarding 
values and promoting equality to enhancing individual freedom, it has been on the 
decline for centuries, in all countries of the world including England. 
Concerns about the impact of globalisation on government authority are well 
placed. But these consequences should be evaluated as to their effect on governments 
of states as well as on the evolving global government.  For the former, the impact of 
the absence of the Rule of Law on sustainable human development could be negative 
not only in authoritarian governments but equally in democratic ones especially 
those lacking in the ideal of isonomy.  For the international system, the adoption of 
the ideal of isonomy and the development of a global political citizenship seem to be 
of great urgency. In his evaluation of the Report of a “Committee on Ministers’ 
Powers”, Ivor Jennings argued that “this rule of law is either common to all nations 
or does not exist [Jennings (1932-1933) quoted in Hayek (1955), p. 54]. This seminal 
statement should be at least equally valid in today’s globalisation environment 
otherwise global rules may not be sustainable.  Rules designed to benefit the few 
without compensating the losers will be resisted. Optimism for positive change 
should be guarded however. As Fukuyama [(2000), pp. 212–224] observed, there are 
many structural factors that tend to inhibit the realisation of an optimistic scenario 
for a global equitable Rule of Law. These include size, boundaries, repeated 
interaction, established cultures, and lack of isonomy, justice, and transparency in 
national and global governance, that make the spontaneous emergence of systems of 
cooperative norms unlikely without the helping hand of “rational hierarchical 
authority, in the form of government and formal law”. [For more details, see 
Sirageldin (1999).] 
 
V.  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL 
 ENVIRONMENT: THE RISE OF INEQUALITIES IN 
ENTITLEMENTS AND WORKERS’ INSECURITY 
Human development is viewed as the optimal utilisation of human resources 
leading to increasing per capita welfare and its fair distribution within and across 
generations. Optimum utilisation implies adequate development of the supply of 
human resources, the anticipation of internal and external demand for labour, and the Ismail Sirageldin 
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presence of an efficient and equitable allocation mechanism in the labour market. The 
previous discussion indicates that these three basic dimensions of human development 
are sensitive to changes in the global environment. In what follows, we focus the 
discussion on two critical issues in human development and their sensitivity to global 
interdependence: the supply of labour and the emergence of poverty.  
 
The Supply of Labour 
We examine the supply of labour from a population dynamics perspective. 
There are three reasons why we focus on the role of population dynamics in human 
development. The first is that population change is an integral part of the process of 
the symbolic cultural evolution. The second is that demographic change: population 
growth, spatial distribution, and age structure play a pivotal role in development. 
They shape the destiny of development prospects through their consequences, while 
being shaped by development processes and outcomes. The third is that population 
dynamics on the local level produce externalities that radiate to the regional and 
global levels.  
There are three dimensions of labour supply: quantity, quality, and mobility. 
We focus on the first two. Most of the developing countries started the final stage of 
the demographic transition in which fertility started a secular decline. The result is 
that the growth rates of the younger cohorts started to decline while that of the older 
cohorts continues to grow at high rates. The size of the population in the working age 
has been growing at high rates in the developing countries and will continue to grow 
for at least a generation. This phase of the demographic transition provides a window 
of development opportunity in which labour grows while the dependency burden 
declines providing an opportunity for saving and investment in the quality of labour. 
However, the window is only open for a generation. It closes as the population ages 
and the dependency of old age increases. The window is only a potential. It could be 
negative as it could be positive. The built-in growth presents a double-edged 
challenge: how to produce, in the face of high rates of growth, a quality of human 
resources that is internationally competitive and that could also be engaged 
productively in the global labour market? The answer depends on developments in 
the quality and motivation dimensions of future workers. High quality education and 
the development of positive motivation and moral values in and outside the school 
system are the basis for the development of productive and competitive labour. There 
has been significant advance in years of education in most of the developing 
countries. However, with the exception of the East Asia countries, studies of 
educational achievement indicate that most developing countries are lagging behind 
in the quality dimension. The presence of low educational achievement scores, 
especially at the basic level, in the context of the demographic window of 
opportunity combined with the highly mobile external demand for quality labour, has 
negative consequences on human development and requires no additional elaboration. Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
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The second dimension is more qualitative and conjectural. They have to do with 
motivation and morals. Achievement motivation, vision of opportunities, sense of 
discipline, work ethic commitment, and self-esteem that are transmitted from 
generation to the next, are some of the elements that define motivated and progressive 
society. These qualities have been highly strained in many developing countries, 
mainly a result of lack of positive development in the economic and the socio-political 
domains. Motivation and the moral environment is an important dimension of the 
human development. However, its development requires more than formal education. 
Studies of moral development indicate that moral identity—the key source of moral 
commitment throughout life—is fostered by multiple social influences that guide a 
child in the same general direction [Damon (1999), p. 78]. These findings support the 
view that transparency and accountability in governance and isonomy in the Rule of 
Law are prerequisites for the spread of moral conduct. While parents and schools 
provide moral guidance for most children in the formative years by stressing imaginal 
and independent thinking, transparency in governance, isonomy in the Rule of Law, 
and other democratic practice and institutions provide the needed support and 
enforcement beyond the formative years. Motivations and morals are not independent 
of the type of government and governance and, especially their synergies with the 
globalisation processes. These are critical issues that require careful and forward 
looking perspectives since established institutions probably reflect the interest of 
powerful establishments, while evolving cultures tend to change slowly. Furthermore, 
the search for common values in societies with pluralistic cultures continues to be a 
hotly debated question in philosophy, the social sciences, and the psychology of human 
behaviour [Mitias (2001)]. The case of an open global system makes it more of a 
challenge, since the global village has the most cultural diversity. 
 
Poverty 
Our brief review of the opportunities and constraints set by the demographic 
window of opportunity indicates the potential for sustained growth that could lead to 
sustained reduction in poverty, if the right policy environment prevails. The potential 
saving from a pure demographic structure could be channelled towards equitable 
human capital formation with internationally competitive quality. Countries in East 
Asia including Malaysia and Indonesia were able to follow that path towards 
sustainable development and reduced poverty. There are trade-offs however, between 
growth, distribution and poverty as illustrated by recent economic modelling that 
include political factors in their specifications [cf. Rodrik (1998)]. Some provide 
enlightened policy recommendations. For example, in a recent study of poverty in the 
Arab World and the role of inequity and growth, Ali and Elbadawi (2002) used a 
simple dynamic model of poverty, growth, and distribution to explain the observed 
experience of selected developing countries located in four regions: the Arab region 






































 Source: Based on Figure 4.2, in Ali and Elbadawi (1999). 
 
Fig. 1.  Dynamics of Poverty in Four Regions (Predicted Annual 
  Average Change in Poverty for 1975–96). 
 
allows investigating for which countries a sustained reduction in poverty would require 
the acceleration of growth, redistributive measures, or both. The findings reproduced in 
Figure 1 are illustrative of how poverty responds to changes in growth and distribution 
during the 1975-1996 period of analysis. For the six Arab countries, although the rate 
of economic growth was relatively high at 3.3 percent, poverty increased by 1.3 
percent mainly a result of the predicted high rate of growth in inequality, at 4.4 percent. 
For Sub-Sahara Africa, the predicted growth in poverty was positive, mainly a result of 
worsening inequality, economic growth had no effect in reducing poverty since its 
average was zero during the period. The experience of Latin America was similar to 
that of the African countries, low growth and worsening inequality that generated a 
high rate of growth in poverty. On the other hand, there was a significant decline in 
poverty in the Asia sample (China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka). 
The increase in inequality was sizable but was more than compensated for by a large 
growth effect that dominated the negative distributional effect. However, the findings 
indicate that group averages do not reflect the behaviour of individual countries. There 
are significant differences in the behaviour of countries within the four groups. 
As discussed earlier, the developing countries in general are in the midst of 
basic economic-demographic transformation that presents potentialities and challenges. 
Potentialities are represented by examples of countries that were able to move into a 
sustainable development path that significantly reduced the incidence of poverty. In 
most cases, this has been achieved by strengthening the determinants of long-term Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
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growth, mainly egalitarian quality education, efficient institutions, and the adoption 
of the Rule of Law and Isonomy in governance. The absence of these structural 
conditions, leads to lower growth, higher incidence of poverty, and the erosion of 
progressive ethical systems [Sirageldin (2000)]. Poverty-alleviation policies should 
be viewed in this dynamic context of interaction between growth prospects and 
progressive values, not only as catalyst but more essential as complement to both.  
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Summary 
The evolutionary approach of the present paper attempts to place the present 
phase of global interdependence and human development in historical perspective. 
For many millennia, human reach has been extended through the accelerated 
processes of the symbolic cultural evolution. The modus operandi of the symbolic 
cultural evolution, in its present technophysio phase or scientific materialism, is 
knowledge-based; it helps to maintain and promote scientific and technological 
developments, their technical application and utilisation, and the intergenerational 
preservation of such knowledge through advances in educational methods, content, 
and quality. At present, human destiny is to know, if only because societies with 
knowledge dominate societies that lack it and that there is, once reached a threshold 
level, a built-in catalytic growth of learning. Most of the developing countries have 
not yet reached the threshold level of learning since the evolutionary developments 
in science and technology are lagging and the lag is not necessarily a lack of finance. 
It is partly a psychology of discouragement if not despair, a perception of an un-
bridged gap of knowledge, and, accordingly, lack of commitment. Without mastering 
and joining in the development of advances in science and technology, this part of 
the world will continue to lag behind. As we argued elsewhere, this should not 
necessarily be the case [Sirageldin (1999)]. 
Human brains have identically similar basic structures that, given a random 
distribution of disabilities, allow for equal potential of learning. The DNA of an 
individual is made up of about equal contributions of all ancestors that extend for 
hundreds of thousands of generations, of which present parents contribute an 
insignificant part. Furthermore, advances in communication and information 
technologies have facilitated and accelerated the speed of the flow of new knowledge 
and reduced the global cost of its acquisition.  In the developing countries, the main 
constraints on acquiring and developing scientific knowledge are apparently relative 
cost and benefit, the lack of necessary institutions, and the lack of unified goals on 
the local and state levels. 
In the past, many developing countries did not seem to have the resources to 
deal with important social problems. How could a country with limited resources and 
soaring budget deficit afford the funding of expensive social programmes: reduce Ismail Sirageldin 
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teacher-student ratios, make college education relevant and affordable, broaden access 
to health care, improve the quality of urban life, or reduce environmental degradation, 
all essential programmes for sustainable long-term development? However, when 
countries’ economic conditions improve and resources become available, still nothing 
happens in most of these countries. The question is why? 
There are known and justifiable reasons to blame the external environment for 
this apparent lack of such fundamental development. But as we argued elsewhere 
(ibid), there is a need for fundamental Internally-Oriented Sustainable Reform 
(IOSR). As we discussed, the privatisation of risk in financial activities increased 
risk and made it harder to regulate. It is interesting to note that confidence may be 
affected by changes in confidence in other similar activities. For example, a bank 
failure may make people think that there is something wrong with all banks and 
accordingly distrust there own bank, even if it was the best run institution. This 
contagious tendency is not confined to the financial sector although it is more 
evident there. For example, a government failure somewhere may equally induce 
distrust in all governments. Or, an unproductive performance of labour in a 
developing country may induce distrust and reduce direct investment in other 
developing countries. These examples call for more not less investment in sound 
internal sustainable reform (IOSR). 
A main reason for the lack of long-term commitment is the political system that 
is supposed to be cleansed from corruption in the era of transparency in the new global 
system but has been increasingly driven by big money and short-term financial gains 
while lacking in the Rule of Law. It is not evident when, or under what circumstances 
developing countries might embark on the kind of reform that would bring their own 
ideals to bear on its political system and economy. There is no obvious answer but we 
may mention some important factors that constrain reform in most of the developing 
countries. 
  1. In general, democracy functions best when workers, consumers, and citizens 
have acquired countervailing power against the might of business and 
business leaders. In the global environment, that might is external to most 
countries of the world, especially the developing countries. International 
business enjoy an inherent advantage because of its hold over technology and 
finance capital, the wealth at its disposal, the influence in local governments, 
and the relative ease with which it can organise itself. 
  2. Political reform in most of the developing countries seems to be self-
defeating. The political systems seem to reinforce social and political 
inequality. In countries where parliamentary systems exist, voters and 
participants lost confidence in the integrity of the system and become cynical 
and alienated, thus reinforcing the domination of the same pattern.  It is 
important to limit the role of wealth and concentrated economic and political Privatisation of Risk and Human Development 
 
327
power play in the electoral system. The role of isonomy is fundamental for 
political reform. 
  3. Alienation towards the political system seems to extend to professionals and 
experts who are supposed to be committed to the national interest, stand 
above class, religion or race, and stand for the national interest. This group is 
losing the trust of normal citizens because of their apparent loss of civic 
responsibility. 
  4. The presence of instability is greater among the developing countries than 
the rest of the world. A situation that contributes to a culture of 
uncertainty and discouragement. The early sociological theory of 
progress; success breads success seems absent in most of these countries. 
This is partly a lack of long-term vision of sustainable development: 
quality education, transparency in government, isonomy, and democratic 
participation are important foundation. The maxim that moral 
development should be supported, with consistency, at the various stages 
of the life course, including the conduct of public affairs, should be taken 
as a necessary foundation for human development.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
First. It is a main thesis of the present paper, that a major threat to human 
development in the Twenty-first Century is the adherence of Homo sapiens to outdated 
cultures. Although Homo sapiens have entered the age of the symbolic cultural 
evolution thousands of years ago and perfected its symbolism and its implied 
preference for the resolution of conflict with reason rather than force, they continue to 
adhere to the pre-symbolic culture of conflict that may have been fit for the age of 
anatomical evolution of hundreds of thousands of years past. The culture of conflict, 
hostility, and antagonism seems to prevail in the conduct of modern Homo sapiens, 
with enormous losses to the potential for human development, especially in the 
developing countries. Armed with accelerated scientific advances, a culture of hostility 
and non-cooperation could present even more serious threats to sustainable human 
development. 
Second. A major issue in the present global environment is its implied value 
system: the reliance on market solutions as supreme. It is not evident how a global 
ethical system may develop in such state to provide a human filter to market 
outcomes, especially where a “clash of civilisations” is being promoted as 
inevitable, rather than a rational and reasoned dialogue. In a recent discussion of 
Poverty [Sirageldin (2001a)], I attempted to apply Naqvi’s four Islamic ethical 
axioms as a filter to evaluate policies for poverty alleviation. We concluded that 
Islam views society as a unified entity in which individual freedom and human 
dignity is supreme although subject to the axiom of responsibility. Within that 
ethical framework, policies should not develop ‘dependency’, amoral activities, or Ismail Sirageldin 
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lead to the institutionalisation of poverty. Policies based on transfers that do not 
lift the poor from their dependency status should be avoided except in cases where 
such shift is not feasible. Based on the conceptual and empirical evidence, some 
presented in this paper, we concluded that Islamic ethics support a poverty-
alleviation strategy based on the principle of promoting economic growth with 
productive equity. 
Third. Values need to be interpreted with clarity to serve as guide for policy. For 
example, success in promoting sustainable development may be enhanced by following 
the Quraniq call for preparedness: “Be Prepared for Them with all your Strength.” 
I interpret “Preparedness” as the development of long-term internal policies 
(IOSR) with solid commitment, based on continuous study of national and world 
affairs including science, technology and political developments. And interpret 
“Them” as future uncertainties, including changes in the external environment. And 
interpret “Might” not as much the development of military power, but more basic, the 
development of equitable human skills, capabilities and opportunities; and 
transparency and Isonomy in government and governance. 
We should not blame the external environment for all our follies. There is a 
need to continually evaluate our home base and be willing to adapt our institutions to 
deal with changing knowledge and environment. 
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This is a wide-ranging and erudite  essay—on how patterns and modes of 
global interdependence, combined with the privatisation of risk, influence human 
development.  Professor Sirageldin focuses on the diffusion of technology and its 
effect on global interdependence, the privatisation of risk and its management, and 
the changing socio-economic roles of national and local governments.  Finally, he 
attempts to examine the implications of these dynamics for human development in 
the emerging global environment.   
I like the way he de-mythologises globalisation and shows its roots, dating 
back centuries (to the slave and commodity trade). The present phase of 
globalisation, though, is more than just a continuity. It is characterised  by the 
expansion of  I.T. and multinational corporations. 
Prof. Sirageldin claims that for increasing segments of mankind, especially for 
those at the bottom of the development ladder, evolving patterns of global finance 
and governance have significant negative consequences for prospects of human 
development.  For example, his assumption appears to be that upheavals in financial 
markets, and massive volumes of increasingly volatile foreign exchange trading, 
impact unfavourably on human development. 
In the section of the paper dealing directly with human development in the 
emerging  global environment,  Prof.  Sirageldin focuses on the supply of labour and 
the emergence of poverty.  As others have also noted, fertility decline opens up a 
window of development opportunity in which the dependency burden declines.  This 
lasts about a generation.  The question he raises is: how to produce, over this period, 
human resources that are internationally competitive? This  depends on quality and 
motivation of future workers. He notes that in terms of educational achievement, 
only the East Asian countries have excelled. (I believe, however, that we need to 
think about why they have excelled.  We would not necessarily have predicted it 50 
years ago as they climbed out of the post-World War II and Korean War malaise.) 
His address then moves to some highly speculative discussion about 
motivation, vision, work ethic, etc. and argues that these have been under strain in 
many developing countries, mainly as a result of lack of positive development in the 
economic and socio-political domains.  He concludes by arguing that societies with 
knowledge dominate societies that lack it.  Lags in science and technology in the 
developing societies are associated with a psychology of discouragement, a 
perception of an unbridged gap of knowledge and, accordingly, a lack of 
commitment.  He argues that a major reason for the lack of long-term  commitment 
is the political system that remains corrupt.  Prof.  Sirageldin’s pessimism reaches a Gavin W. Jones  332
crescendo here, stressing that political reform in most developing countries seems to 
be self-defeating. The political systems seem to reinforce social and political 
inequality. 
I see a real resonance here with the recent experience in Indonesia. I have 
made at least a dozen visits to Indonesia since the Suharto regime fell in may 1998. I 
witnessed the early euphoria among my Indonesian colleagues, their hope of real 
political, social and legal reform, replaced by increasing disillusionment and 
cynicism.  The Attorney General admits that 90 percent of judges can be bought; the 
collapsed financial sector remains unreformed; the political èlite squabble among 
themselves and show no inclination to seize the moment for real reform. There is 
growing discouragement among ordinary Indonesians, and a fear that the country 
will disintegrate in a spate of ethnic and religious violence and demands for regional 
independence. 
But even so, that is one country, albeit a major one. Is it appropriate to be so 
pessimistic about the prospects for developing countries as a whole? There used to 
be a euphoria about East Asia’s prospects, and even today East and Southeast Asia 
are not doing too  badly.  India is touted as the up-and-coming I.T. growth area. The 
lesson seems to be to look for elements of these countries’ experience that are 
relevant for development efforts in those countries that are not doing as well, rather 
than to accept a generalised pessimism. 
As mentioned earlier,  Prof. Sirageldin’s paper touches on the demography of 
human resource development. Let me therefore raise one point he does not mention. 
Projections covering the next 30 years show extreme dichotomies in growth of the 
working-age population.  In Japan, the working-age population will fall substantially, 
and it will also fall in Europe and barely grow in North America.  In many 
developing countries that have experienced fertility declines, growth of the working-
age population will be only modest over the next 30 years.  By contrast, in Pakistan 
it will grow massively.  Countries such as Japan will face severe labour  shortages. 
Meanwhile, Pakistan will be struggling to find work for its growing millions. 
Globalisation in the future may have to incorporate a freeing up of labour markets, 
not just a freeing up of capital and financial flows.   The demographic realities may 
force countries’ hands here. 
This could provide a major opportunity for Pakistan to export surplus workers 
to fill major shortfalls in industrialised countries.  But Pakistan’s wealth of workers 
will only be exportable if they are will trained.  In the world of the 21st century, 
poorly trained workers are definitely not an asset.  Herein lies the challenge for 
Pakistan’s education and training systems.       
 
Gavin W. Jones 
Australian  National  University,          





To start with one must remember that the title of Professor Sirageldin’s paper 
is not Globalisation but Global Interdependence.  These are not necessarily the same 
thing, even though the author has emphasised convergences.  Yet in fairness, the 
author does underline the diversity of perspectives on globalisation. These 
divergences cover a wide field, the following three being the main approaches: 
(a) As the sum of all negatives—Extension of Western Imperialism. 
(b) A product of technological advance. 
(c) Global interdependence—anchored in the classical case for free trade and  
international factor movements.  This is the perspective that the author 
adopts. 
In the wider framework of historical development, the course of globalisation 
has been shaped by the confluence of least six different factors: 
  1. Conceptual underpinnings provided by the theory of free trade and of 
optimal distribution of production linked to factor endowments.  One could 
add to this the ability to envision the latent potential and seize opportunities 
before they surface. 
  2.  Historical experience of import substitution strategies that were 
characterised by 
  –  Inefficiency—lack of competitive strength. 
  – Creation of rentals through the system of regulation of a protected high 
tariff economy. 
  3. Interests of the powerful players on the international economic stage. look 
at the manner in which textiles and agricultural subsidies were handled in 
the Uruguay Round under the auspices of WTO. 
  4. Abolition of fixed exchange rates and free movement of capital across 
borders. 
  5. The enormous size of the financial markets, beyond the capacity of national 
policy systems. 
  6. The growing influence of multilateral institutions. 
In the interplay of these factors, global interdependence may not be the 
dominant factor.  Furthermore the term interdependence gives the impression of an Saeed Ahmad Qureshi  334
equal or equitable process.  This does not correspond to reality. Indeed, globalisation 
can be seen as a strategy of the North, rather than as a philosophy of universal 
application, espoused for the world-wide benefits of free trade. 
Perhaps a major exception to the constituency factors has been international 
finance, particularly foreign direct investment, which has moved to areas of a better 
return on  investment and has served to promote growth in the developing countries, 
thus contributing to interdependence.  Another such development is the outsourcing  
of computer services where cost economies of the developed countries and the 
export needs of the developing countries seem to converge. Additionally, infor-
mation technology, has been able to ensure instant transmission of  information as 
well as services, across international border without physical   mobility of labour.  In 
this manner, the skilled labour has been globalised. 
While the movement of capital has helped the development process in the poorer 
countries, total reliance on market mechanism has imparted a great deal of volatility and 
instability to the investment processes.  Dramatic reversal of capital transfers had the 
most adverse effects on human development as in East Asia in 1997-98.      
The author devotes considerable space to the discussion on the role of labour 
in the process of globalisation. The emphasis on the role and pattern of labour 
springs from the  premises of his thesis that “Population dynamics at the local level 
produce externalities, that radiate to the regional and global level”.  
However the magnitude and the pattern of this radiation to the global level has 
not been captured by the author. 
In discussing labour, Prof. Sirageldin identifies three relevant areas of labour 
supply: 
 1.  Quantity. 
 2.  Quality. 
 3.  Mobility. 
He then chooses to leave out mobility and elaborates on the other two.  He 
does not indicate the reasons for this exclusion, even though mobility is more 
relevant to the process of globalisation. 
The author has referred to the breakdown of national regulatory capacities, as 
liberalisation spread worldwide.  In fact this is not the reduction of capacity, but the 
obsolescence of the traditional instruments in a market oriented system.  There is a 
need, not only to rebuild this capacity, but align it to the market system.  In this 
endeavour  it is the nature of regulation which is more important, rather than the 
quantum of regulation. 
And the problem is not limited to the national level.  The international system 
must also identify instruments and capacity for reducing the volatility of capital 
movements and possibly the exchange rates.  The current system is highly injurious 
to economic and social stability and forebodes unforeseen crises for the poor. Comments  335
Yet another area where the contemporary theology of free market is   
obstructing policy vision is e-commerce.  It is outside the reach of the monitoring 
systems. It is being left untouched because. 
The overall volume is still small. 
The enterprises are still not profitable.  
Yet there is a case for intervention, not necessarily to regulate it, but to 
monitor the transactions.  The reason is the unevenness of fiscal policy that this 
phenomenon has generated. It is outside the reach of the taxation system. It therefore 
enjoys fiscal rentals, for which there seems to be no justification.  Indeed many 
economists have predicted that in the decades to come, the state is going to die of 
fiscal starvation, because business transaction  would shift to e-commerce and go out 
of the monitoring sphere of the taxation systems. 
Another aspect which could have been highlighted is the need for closer 
interface between the national entities and international systems.  The state has not 
withered away as many had predicted, nor is likely to do so.  But the process of 
globalisation continues to marginalise it.  This situation should be brought back to a 
workable equilibrium.  Indeed globalisation can be defined as a process in which 
policy space is ceded by the national entities to the international systems. These 
systems have shown signs volatility and instability which can lead to a dramatic 
reemergence of poverty as happened in Indonesia  after the 1997 currency crisis. 
Finally the author has rightly emphasised the linkages between the economic 
systems and the ethical systems.  Such a synthesis alone can ensure a sustainable 
pattern of development and bring in the requisite measure of social stability, which is 
required for an equitable and therefore sustainable dispersal of the benefits of 
development.      
  Such a synthesis has not received attention in the literature on development.  
This  could therefore be the beginning of a long arduous journey on the intellectual 
path. 
When this path is negotiated, there are two important milestones that need to 
be covered. First the transition of focus from the so-called human resource 
development to human development, the emphasis being on the outcome rather than 
the input. One must remember that human beings are more than an input into the 
developmental process.  They are the destination of development.  This is not deny 
the role of human resources but a shift of emphasis in the primacy and priority of the 
real objectives of development.  Secondly we need a change in the way we look at 
education.  Economist have taken pains to establish that investment in education is a 
viable economic activity and have stressed the fact that financial costs and benefits 
are positive.  In the preoccupation with financial returns they have often forgotten 
that the main merit of education lies in the fact that it brings human beings closer to 
the realisation of their full potential. What is even more crucial, it is a great equaliser Saeed Ahmad Qureshi  336
of opportunity. Trying to justify it on the basis of financial returns, trivialises 
education. 
This conceptual transition would balance the judgements and improve the 
accuracy of perceptions. One should live to see the day when such a transition is 
completed.       
 
Saeed Ahmad Qureshi 
Islamabad. 
 